Response to natural disasters such as storms have gained wide spread attention.
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In this paper we describe the response to Hurricane Ivan by a small municipality located in South Central Pennsylvania.
Specifically because of lessons learned from Ivan, the community took more of an innovative approach to flood management. For the first time, the community embarked on a hazard mitigation plan and established a flood management task force. Through analyzing the response, three potential sources of resilience are identified: social capital, improvisation and learning. Preliminary findings suggest that social capital facilitates the effectiveness of a community to organize in response to crisis situations.
INTRODUCTION
How can communities be made more resilient in their response to crises? Since the events of September 11, 2001, the emphasis on emergency management preparedness has primarily focused on planning. However, lessons learned from these events suggest that it is not practical or even feasible to plan for every foreseeable contingency. For example, when organizations are faced with crisis situations they tend to maintain continuity, shift to contingency plans or engage in improvisation. In order to analyze these effects, we have been studying emergency management practices of local communities for over a year. More recently, we have been investigating the response to Hurricane Ivan by two communities: Penn State Harrisburg/Lower Swatara Township and University Park/State College. Our approach is to establish partnerships with emergency managers in order to gain a better understanding of how they organized to respond to Ivan.
This work prompts questions about inter- and intra-organizational learning and the ways in which organizations engage in improvised action. In addition, we examine the ways in which the organizations shift from planned action (espoused-theories) to real-time action (theories-in-use) in order to identify factors that enhance and undermine performance. Preliminary findings suggest that social capital facilitates the effectiveness of a community to organize in response to crisis situations. Therefore, we suggest that social capital is related to improvisation and learning.
EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT ACTIVITY
Since 9/11 there have been considerable efforts to enhance emergency management preparedness. As such, emergency management represents a central activity. A central activity is defined as one whose successful execution is critical to the accomplishment of an entity’s goals (Huber and McDaniel, 1986). As a consequence, Pennsylvania State Title 35 requires that every municipality have an emergency management coordinator.
Emergency management communities can be characterized as minimal organizations. For instance, these communities are prone to experience fundamental surprises and events that are incomprehensible (Weick, 1993). Moreover, emergency management communities exist in a broader multi-agency context. Consequently, emergency management communities are prone to communication breakdowns to include radio frequency problems and data
interoperability.
Whenever emergency management teams are dispatched to respond to a crisis situation, they maintain continuity, shift to contingency plans or engage in improvisation. For this reason, performance requires a balance between improvisation and learning.
EM IN LOWER SWATARA TOWNSHIP
In this section, we characterize the Lower Swatara Township emergency management activity. Lower Swatara
Township is situated in South Central Pennsylvania. The Township covers 12.4 square miles with a population of
8,149. As with many communities, Lower Swatara Township lost its EMS service. The Township is now
subscribed to the Penn State Milton S. Hershey Medical Center for EMS services. They average approximately
1000 calls per year. Moreover, the Township has a volunteer fire department.
In addition to the Township emergency management activity, Lower Swatara Township is also in part responsible
for emergency management at Penn State Harrisburg, Harrisburg International Airport, Air National Guard and a
nearby fuel farm.
Penn State Harrisburg was founded in 1966 on what used to be Olmsted Air Base. Student enrollment is
approximately 3,800, however; only 300 students actually live on campus. The Penn State Harrisburg/Lower
Swatara Township communities have certainly experienced their share of large scaled emergencies in the past.
Three of the most well known incidents were (1) Hurricane Agnes – 1972; (2) Hurricane Eloise – 1975; and (3) TMI
Incident – 1979. Following Agnes, Penn State Harrisburg was used as a communalizations center and provided land
for temporary housing. The Department of Housing and Urban Development HUD provided100 trailers for local
residents whose homes were flooded. The second incident was Hurricane Eloise in 1975. Again the campus was
used for temporary shelter.
The third and most notable critical incident was Three Mile Island on March 28, 1979. Of particular relevance, the
Kemeny Commission hearings were held on the campus in the Capital Union Building. Additionally, there were a
large number of dignitaries and community leaders on campus. PSH was instrumental in providing communications
equipment.
Kevin Stoehr is the chief of police and current emergency management coordinator at Penn State Harrisburg. Kevin
is a 50 year old Caucasian male with a master's in criminal justice and a bachelor in business management. Alan
Knoche is the current emergency management coordinator for Lower Swatara Township. Alan is a 55 year old
Caucasian male. He retired from TMI while serving in the capacity of senior emergency planner in the emergency
preparedness department. This department was responsible for writing and maintaining the nuclear station's
emergency plan and implementing procedures; providing training to on-site and off-site personnel; developing,
executing, and evaluating drills and exercises; maintaining and testing emergency communications systems and
warning systems; maintaining emergency facilities; and coordinating off-site support at the local, county, state, and
federal level. According to Alan, working in the TMI Emergency Preparedness Department was a source of
unbeatable experience with a structured program and it provided excellent contacts with individuals at all levels of
the emergency response spectrum.
In addition to the valuable experienced gained at TMI, Alan also has six years of advanced training in the Navy Nuclear Power Program. More importantly, in accordance with Pennsylvania Title 35, Alan is certified at the advanced level through PEMA. Other notable experience includes prior duties as former deputy fire chief and EMT. As with many emergency management coordinators, Alan’s EM duty is a collateral responsibility. As a consequence, he is only fractionally committed to emergency management. His primary responsibilities are Code Enforcement Officer and Assistant Zoning Officer. Lower Swatara Township is indeed similmanagement and goes well beyond the minimum requirements. For instance, Lower Swatara Township has a dedicated emergency operations center.
Given the enormous wealth of experience and the accumulation of social capital, one can comprehend the
comprehensive emergency operation center in the Township. The EOC is equipped with maps and multiple communications devices and media, including a computer. Furthermore, the EOC is located adjacent to a mid-sized conference room equipped with drop down telephone lines, strips along the wall for tactical notes and a television. Additionally, the conference room is adjacent to the Township board of commissioners meeting room. Indeed, the EOC in Lower Swatara Township represents the ideal model for small municipalities.
The emergency management agency in the Township has a staff of approximately 22 people. Part of the success of the agency and the EOC is attributed to the Township being situated in the TMI emergency planning zone. As a result, the EMA must constantly ensure that their procedures, notification, contact numbers, and resource manuals are updated. Moreover, the EMA undergoes training and performs graded exercises, which sometimes involves aPEMA observer, or a FEMA evaluator.
THE INCIDENT
In this section, we provide a descriptive account of how the community responded to emergencies and made actual
rescues during Hurricane Ivan. Theses events represent three situations ordered in time; Jednota Flats, Swatara Park, and subsequent boil water advisory. Hurricane Ivan occurred on September 18, 2004. It was no secret that the storm was coming. As such, EMA officials held meetings two days in advance to strategize. Barricades were prestaged in chronic flood areas.
Officials went to bed on Friday night before the storm hoping for the best but expecting the worst. About 2:00 a.m.
Alan received a call from the police indicating significant flooding in the Jednota Flats area.
Jednota Flats Flood
The Jednota Flats area in the southern section of the Township experienced heavy surface run-off from torrential
rains, but most of the flooding occurred from overflow of Stoner Run. The normal drainage pathway was overwhelmed resulting in water flooding the Flats and filling and overflowing Lisa Lake. Houses and trailers located in the area suffered significant flooding.
When Alan arrived at the scene, he witnessed four firefighters wading in waist deep water, carrying an elderly
person in a basket on their shoulders. After taking the person to the rescue truck, the firefighters disappeared back in
the dark wading in the water to make more rescues. It became obvious to Alan at this point, that this would be a
rather long-term event. One particular person that was rescued was on home oxygen. This particular scenario was
not in the plan. Therefore a request was made to the county for an unmet need. Within a timely manner, the County
responded by providing home oxygen. Another rescued evacuee required the assistance of a walker. Alan contacted
the Red Cross, which responded by providing a walker. Both of these scenarios provide concrete examples of
situations which require EMA officials to perform without a script. It is in these situations that first responders are
required to improvise.
At the same time, there was significant flooding near the Air National Guard facility that is located at Harrisburg
International Airport. This flooding had the potential to damage millions of dollars worth of equipment, which
would have Homeland Security implications. To alleviate further damage to the facility, Airport officials closed the
flood gates. This had the immediate result of forcing water back into the Township. EMA officials encountered an
element of surprise as water was not able to flow out of the Flats. Given the wealth of accumulated social capital, a
state lawmaker dropped by the EOC in order to offer assistance. At this point, the state lawmaker was briefed on the
situation with the Airport and the critical need to open the flood gate in order to prevent further damage to homes
within the Township. The state lawmaker was able to use his influence to persuade Airport authorities to reopen the
flood gates so that water from the Township could be routed to the Susquehanna River.
Swatara Park Flood
Within hours of the Jednota Flats flood, a call was received that there was significant flooding in the Swatara Park
area. Swatara Park is located along the Swatara Creek, on the east side of the Township. EMA officials had to redirect
resources to this area. A report came in that a disabled vehicle was parked near a culvert and was blocking a drainage path. Through the police department’s normal contact with towing companies, they were able to have thear to many communities which strive to balance emergency management activities with other day-to-day responsibilities. At the same time, Lower Swatara Township is different with respect to its allocation of resources to emergency management. The Township benefits from a Board of Commissioners that actively supports emergency car towed. Again, the scenario of a disabled vehicle blocking a culvert was not in the plan. EMA officials were able to draw on strong ties in the community in order to address the situation at hand.
Both flood zones required the evacuation of residents. Initially, the evacuees were taken to the Lower Swatara Fire Station social hall. The fire station social hall is usually the facility of first choice and has been used during floods and blizzards. Once the Red Cross shelter was up and running at the MCSO building in Middletown, all evacuees were relocated (by bus) to that facility. This freed up the fire station for extended disaster operations. Later, Alan and staff identified restrictions and requested people to remain out of the flooding.
In response to both flood areas, EMA officials experienced communications problems. First, the ambulance assigned to the Township did not have a mobile radio capable of communicating on the Township radio frequency. Communication between the Township and EMS occurred through Dauphin County Dispatch. A hand-held radio was later provided by Lower Swatara EMA to the EMS crew chief. This allowed direct communication. Second, in order to minimize radio traffic, EMA officials extensively used Nextel cellular phones in order to reach each other.
Boil Water Advisory
The third event occurred shortly after the flood. Alan received a call from a citizen concerned about the water pressure. Alan contacted the County and he was told that they were going to contact him regarding the issue. Apparently, United Water’s pumping stations along the Swatara Creek and Susquehanna River experienced problems during storm. The protocol in place requires that United Water communicate any problems with the water to the County and it is the county’s responsibility to communicate the problem to the municipalities.
Boil water advisories typically occur when the turbidity level exceeds 1.0. At this point, federal and state regulations require that a boil water advisory be issued (see Table 1). After the boil water advisory was issued, a recorded message was available for concerned citizens that called in to the Township as well as signs on the door. In addition, the problem was communicated via press releases to the local radio and television stations. EMS staff and police department personnel then went door to door in affected areas that could be reached and handed out flyers. Email, website nor cable was used.
HARRISBURG SERVICE TERRITORY
HARRISBURG, PA, 9/18/2004 11:14:15 PM –
United Water Issues Boil Water Advisory
United Water has issued a boil water advisory for all residents
of the east shore within the Harrisburg service territoy. The
boil water advisory is the result of the weather conditions
causing flooding that has impacted operations at our water
treatment plants. Water should be brought to a rolling boil for
one minute, according to Federal Emergency Management
Agency recommendations. Customers should boil water for
the following: drinking, cooking or baking, making ice cubes,
taking medication, brushing teeth, washing food, mixing baby
formula or food, mixing juices or drinks, feeding pets, and all
other consumption. Water does not have to be boiled for the
following activities: showering, washing dishes or clothes.
Residents should boil their water until further notice.
Table 1 – Boil Water Advisory
Lower Swatara Township did not have potable water. This was considered and unmet need and communicated to the
county level. Just by coincidence, one of the county commissioners who was previously on the Township board of commissioners stopped in to see if he could assist in some way. The commissioner used his contacts and political clout. Consequently, the Township became a water distribution point. Pallets of water were trucked in from a local distribution center. Each citizen could drop by public works and pick up one gallon of water per day. Once supplies were low, they called the County again for an unmet need and the supply was replenished. Overall, the supply was
perfect.
Similar to drinking needs, there was also a need to flush toilets. Since, the storm occurred in mid September, most of the pools in the Township were full. Residents were encouraged to borrow water from their neighbors’ pools in order to flush toilets. In addition, it was suggested that the runoff water could also be used to flush toilets.
In summary, Ivan caused major flooding in the area and water contamination. As this story played out, we can conclude that it was virtually impossible to plan for every situation that occurred during the response to Ivan. Certain actions that took place during the response primarily existed in community memory. These particular details are not codified in the written plans or protocols. Moreover, detailed planning in response to Ivan may have left little room for improvisation.
SOURCES OF RESILIENCE
Given this story of Ivan’s affects on Lower Swatara Township, three potential sources of resilience are identified:
social capital, improvisation and learning.
Social Capital and Improvisation – The Response
The concept of social capital is one of the most popular recent exports from sociological theory (Portes, 1998). More recently social capital has been come the focus for organizational maintenance and development (Cohen and Prusak, 2001). Broadly, social capital represents the goodwill derived from the network of relations that can be mobilized to facilitate the pursuit of collective goals and team effectiveness (Rosenthal, 1996, Adler and Kwon, 2002, Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1998, Lesser, 2000). We see this played out in the Ivan story as the community organized effectively during the response. From a resource perspective, Adler and Kwon (2002) define social capital as “the goodwill available to individuals or groups. Its sources lie in the structure and content of the actor’s social relations. Its effects flow from the information, influence, and solidarity it makes available to the actor” (p. 23). From a structural perspective, social capital is defined as “the configuration of a group’s members’ social relationships within the social structure and the group itself, as well as in the broader social structure of the organization to which the group belongs, through which necessary resources for the group can be accessed” (Oh et al. 2004, p. 861).
Two patterns emerge in the treatments of social capital. First, the sociocentric (Sandefur and Laumann, 1998), and much of the whole network (Wellman, 1988) variants of sociology focuses on the positive network externalities that are derived from network closure (Coleman, 1988, Putnam, 2000), elsewhere referred to as internal, communal or bonding social capital (Adler and Kwon, 2002). This view is characterized by a high density network in which all members of the community are connected. Bonding social capital is characterized by stronger reciprocity of norms and trust (Coleman, 1988), as well as bounded solidarity (Granovetter, 1983) which all facilitate a shared understanding.
The alternative model is the egocentric variant of network analysis. This approach focuses on the positive externalities that are derived from bridging (linking) or external social capital (Burt, 1992). This view is characterized by structural holes in groups. This becomes important as groups tap into the expertise, resources and knowledge of other groups in the broader context.
During the response to Ivan the EMA leveraged bonding social capital in order to facilitate effective response. Those that make up the EMA know each other on a first name basis and have frequent contact with each other. To illustrate, when a vehicle accident occurs, the police, fire department and EMS all respond to the scene. They are there working together. In this regard, they strengthen their bonding social capital on a continual basis. With respect to the vehicle blocking the culvert, the community improvised by calling a towing company. It is the same business that works routinely with the police department when removing vehicles illegally parked or following an accident. Moreover, the community was able to respond to two critical flood areas in a timely manner, and also able to improvise where needed.
Another key aspect of the community’s response was their ability to leverage bridging social capital. Through Alan’s extensive contacts, he has to ability to tap into other groups and agencies. The story illustrates two concrete examples of how the community leveraged its bridging social capital. First, the state lawmaker assisted the community in their efforts to persuade Airport authorities to re-open the flood gates. Second, the County commissioner was instrumental in leveraging his political clout to address the unmet need for potable water. Other the American Red Cross.
What we learned from this story is that both bonding and bridging social capital were important for effective response and improvisation. Improvisation involves intuition guiding action in a spontaneous way. It is a kind of real-time, short-term learning and a mechanism to enhance long-term organizational learning. By leveraging both forms, the community was able to get the necessary support and resources that were needed in a timely manner. Indeed, their social capital and their capability to improvise allowed them to be more resilient.
Organizational Learning – The Aftermath
There were a lot of resources expended from the aftermath of Ivan. In addition, there was major flooding and water
contamination. The goal during the aftermath was to try to get people back into their homes and attempt to restore
normal living conditions. As sort of an informal post action review, the EMA reflected on the experience, and what
could be done to make sure that similar events are not as severe. They reflected on what worked and what did not. It
is through this process that the EMA engaged in organizational learning.
Organizational learning is a multi level construct that manifests itself at individual, group and organizational level of analysis. It involves a systematic change in behavior or knowledge informed by experience. According to (Argyris and Schön, 1978), “organizational learning involves the detection and correction of errors” (p. 2). Error is defined as a mismatch between expectations of an organization’s strategy or goals and actual outcomes. Argyris further makes a distinction between single-loop learning and double-loop learning. Problem solving that enables the organization to enhance performance while carrying out its current objectives is referred to as single loop learning. A more radical and systematic approach is double loop learning. In the double loop mode the organization reconstructs its underling norms and values, resulting in new and innovative solutions to problems.
Similarly, Argyris notes that learning occurs as organizations restructure their theories of action. The theory of action framework consists of espoused theories (planned action) and theories-in-use (real-time action). Espoused theories are codified in plans, protocols and documents that explain or justify a pattern of activity. On the other hand, theories-in-use represents the actual actions that were undertaken to respond to a crisis. In typical situations, there is a gap between the espoused theory and the theory-in-use. Recognizing this gap provides learning opportunities.
Upon reflecting on the response to Hurricane Ivan, the community went through somewhat of an evaluation of their action strategies, values and assumptions. Specifically because of lessons learned from Ivan and through reflection, the community decided to take an innovative approach to flood management. To that end, the community embarked on a hazard mitigation plan and has established a flood management task force.
Hazard Mitigation Plan
The two chronic flood planes in the Township have existed for almost 100 years. Until Ivan, the community engaged solely in single loop learning. This consisted of going through the normal emergency management cycle. However, after Ivan, the Township is taking a different approach. In order to minimize disruption, the Township plans to purchase homes in the Jednota Flats areas. This would relieve some of the strain on the Township during floods that occur from the Susquehanna River and the Swatara Creek. If successful, the homes would be leveled and the area turned into a park.
The hazardous mitigation plan is a partnership with Skelly and Loy – an engineers-consultants firm that offers comprehensive services in environmental research, planning, and design. This partnership includes a comprehensive plan that involves all Townships and municipalities in Dauphin County. FEMA and PEMA approval has been received to use Federal Hazard Mitigation Grant Program funds to purchase two homes in Jednota Flats. The price for each of the two homes has been established and confirmed. Next steps are to obtain the money and close on the homes, and distribute a request for bids for demolition of the structures.
Flood Management Taskforce
Following Ivan, a 2,200 gallon-per-minute pump ran for exactly one month, 24 hours/day. Given the extensive response and recovery effort, the community established a flood management taskforce. This taskforce includes representatives from multiple organizations. Their mission is to identify ways to reduce flooding in the community. According to Alan, the individuals on the taskforce are committed to it and open to new ideas, two criteria necessaryfor double loop learning. Their last meeting was on September 29, 2005. The next meeting will be scheduled afteran engineering study identifying flow paths and flow rates for different conditions is completed.
The community realized that sedimentation in the ponds had not been cleaned up in twenty years and flow paths are obstructedwith silt and debris. To redress these issues, the Airport has started to clean up its retention pond and pipes. The community on the other hand; has removed silt, debris, and obstructions from the flow path. Moreover, PennDOT is will be cleaning out detention basins. To leverage required training of the Air National Guard, the taskforce plans to solicit support through the Innovative Readiness Program. Through this program the Guard uses personnel and heavy equipment to move dirt around. Finally, the community has reached an agreement with the Airport and Air National Guard. Instead of closing the flood gates, they will be throttled which will ensure drainage from the Township, and at the same time, protect the assets at the Air National Guard base. In summary, the Hazard Mitigation Plan and the Flood Management Taskforce show how the Lower Swatara community is engaging in organizational learning. The community is not only learning from the past events, but working together in order to be prepared in the future, making them more resilient to crises.
IMPLICATIONS
Conclusions suggest that organizations that are faced with crisis situations must maintain a balance between
planning and improvised action. This is evident in our story of Lower Swatara and their response to Hurricane Ivan.
Moreover, our preliminary findings suggest that we need to understand ways in which to build social capital within
both emergency management communities and geographic communities. Social capital facilitated the effective
response to flooding in one community and facilitated improvisation. Likewise, social capital can increase resilience
in other communities. Another finding is that we need to find ways to encourage practitioners to become reflective
inquirers in their practice so that they might foster inter- and intra- community learning. The Lower Swatara case
study is an example of how reflection allows the community to learn. We are currently engaged in exploring the
response of Penn State Harrisburg, as well as, University Park/State College in order to determine if our preliminary
findings are generalizable to other communities.
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Roderick L. Lee
School of Business Administration
The Pennsylvania State University at Harrisburg
Middletown, PA 17057
rlee@psu.edu
Wendy A. Schafer
Center for Human-Computer Interaction
College of Information Sciences & Technology
The Pennsylvania State University
University Park, PA 16802
was15@psu.edu
Alan J. Knoche
Lower Swatara Township
1499 Spring Garden Drive
Middletown, PA 17057
aknoche@lowerswatara.org
John M. Carroll
Center for Human-Computer Interaction
College of Information Sciences & Technology
The Pennsylvania State University
University Park, PA 16802
jmcarroll@psu.edu
